With the increase of network components connected to the Internet, the need to ensure secure connectivity is becoming increasingly vital. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are one of the common security components that identify security violations. This paper proposes a novel multilevel hybrid classifier that uses different feature sets on each classifier. It presents the Discernibility Function based Feature Selection method and two classifiers involving multilayer perceptron (MLP) and decision tree (C4.5). Experiments are conducted on the KDD'99 Cup and ISCX datasets, and the proposal demonstrates better performance than individual classifiers and other proposed hybrid classifiers. The proposed method provides significant improvement in the detection rates of attack classes and Cost Per Example (CPE) which was the primary evaluation method in the KDD'99
Introduction
With the broad usage of the Internet, people are experiencing more security issues than ever before. Consequently Internet users are employing software such as antivirus, antispam, and anti-malware to protect their personal information. Unfortunately, such programs are not enough to protect systems from network attacks such as Denial of Service (DoS). For such kinds of attacks, a specific system known as an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) must be deployed.
Traditionally, intrusion detection methods fall into two main categories according to their method of detection [1] , [2] . These categories are signature-based detection (also known as knowledge-based detection or misuse detection) and anomaly-based detection (also known as behaviorbased detection). Signature based detection methods analyze known attacks to extract the discriminating characteristics and patterns, called signatures. These signatures are compared against the traffic to detect intrusions. Signaturebased detection has a very low False Alarm Rate (FAR); thus, this method has been widely used by commercial IDS vendors. However, the signature-based detection method does not detect any new or unknown attacks. For this reason, researchers focus on anomaly-based detection, which is a powerful method for detecting unknown and new (zeroManuscript received September 3, 2015. Manuscript revised February 8, 2016 . Manuscript publicized April 5, 2016 . † The author is with Mevlana University, Konya, Turkey. † † The author is with Necmettin Erbakan University, Konya Turkey.
† † † The author is with Beykent University, Konya, Turkey. a) E-mail: aozkaya@mevlana.edu.tr DOI: 10.1587/transinf.2015EDP7357 day) attacks. It analyzes the patterns of normal network and system activities, and classifies them as anomalous if they differ from normal patterns [1] . Because machine learning algorithms enable computer systems to learn in a manner similar to the way in which a human learns, they are typically used in anomaly-based IDS. With machine learning algorithms, the system can learn and analyze complex datasets and decide which input is an intrusion and which is not. However, because datasets used in IDS are generally huge, the use of machine learning algorithms to train the system is time consuming. By removing unrelated features using a process known as Feature Selection (FS), the dataset becomes smaller. Having a smaller dataset decreases the learning complexity, the training time, and the required system memory. Moreover, it is widely known that unrelated features negatively impact the learning system. Thus, removing unrelated features will also increase the learning performance. As a result, FS improves the classification rate and lightens the IDS. Therefore, FS methods have been widely used in artificial intelligence and machine learning, particularly when dealing with huge datasets [3] . FS also has become widespread in IDS [2] , [4] - [9] .
In this study, a wrapper based FS is applied by using the Discernibility Function introduced in [10] as the search algorithm to create candidate feature subsets and the BackPropagation (BP) algorithm to evaluate the feature subsets. Then, the C4.5 (decision tree) and BP algorithms, which are widely used in IDS related papers and show good classification rates [11] - [17] are applied. The C4.5 and BP are then combined in the experiments and compared with the results of individual methods. With this hybrid method, good accuracies for classification and better Cost Per Example (CPE) values are obtained.
The paper is organized as follows: a description of the Discernibility Function Based Feature Selection Method [10] is presented in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3, the Multilevel Hybrid Classifier with Variant Feature sets (MHCVF) is discussed and Sect. 4 contains the conclusions.
Discernibility Function Based Feature Selection Method
The purpose of this study is to improve the classification rate of the intrusion detection dataset, to decrease the classification cost of the machine learning algorithms and to lighten the IDS. Therefore FS, which finds the optimal minimum
Copyright c 2016 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers feature subset that also represents the original dataset, is applied. Typically, one dataset has many Minimal Subsets (MSs). The discernibility matrix-based approach is capable of generating all MSs of features. By using a discernibility matrix-based program, such as the Rough Set Exploration System (RSES) exhaustive search approach, 2N1 subsets must be generated and verified to obtain all MSs for a dataset with N features. However, the generation of 2N-1 subsets is a problem of an exponential complexity of N. This process consumes a huge amount of memory and time, even for a medium-sized dataset. Rough Set Theory based FS has been used in other IDS related studies [18] , [19] in which the minimal subsets are obtained with various programs without computing all MSs. Therefore, it is possible to overlook the optimal ones. One of the goals of this study is to compute all MSs and find the best MSs without the risk of losing the optimal ones. Because this is a problem with high computational complexity, a new method, the Decision Relative Discernibility Function-Based FS that is proposed by Kahramanli et al. [10] , is applied. This method obtains the same results faster and with less memory required than the regular Rough Set method. In this study, Kahramanli's method is called the Discernibility Function Based Feature Selection (DFBFS) method. The DFBFS is used as a wrapper based FS and is applied in the first stage of the proposed method. According to the knowledge of the authors, this is the first study that applies the DFBFS on intrusion detection datasets. Applying the DFBFS will generate all possible MSs of features in which unrelated features of the intrusion detection datasets have been discarded. After that, optimal feature subsets will be evaluated and selected with the BP algorithm. The comprehensive description of the DFBFS method that is applied in the first stage can be found in [10] ; a brief description is provided in this section.
The DFBFS method selects all subsets of features with minimal size that contain relevant features for the dataset. The DFBFS method has three steps, as shown in Fig. 1 .
Let's consider a dataset represented as S = {E, C ∪ D},
is a set of condition features, and
is a decision feature. Table 1 shows an example of a dataset with 
Obtaining Bit-Based Discernibility Function
A discernibility matrix is a symmetric matrix with the following entries: 
The code-based form of discernibility function of the dataset shown in Table 1 is
In this study, the bit-based form of the discernibility function B b f D is used and defined as
The B b f D of the dataset shown in Table 1 is obtained as follows: 
As a result, the minimized form of the B b f D is obtained:
Deriving Subset of Features
The subsets of the datasets can be obtained by converting 
For creating the subsets of features in DNF, the "OR" Boolean operator is used between the elements of E(B b f D min ) as the following expression:
For Eq. (11), the DNF of the dataset given in Table 1 can be obtained as follows: (13) DNF(S) has subsets of features of the dataset given in Table 1. One of these subsets can be used instead of the original dataset. These subsets define the original dataset and do not contain irrelevant or redundant features. To show the subsets in a code-based form, the 1's positions can be associated with the condition features indicated in Table 1 as
According to the explanation above, two feature subsets each (known as candidate feature subset) with two features are obtained from the dataset that originally had four features (Table 1) . In other words, each subset has reduced the size of the dataset by 50%. The next step of the wrapper based FS is to evaluate each feature subset with a learning algorithm, which is the BP in this study.
Multilevel Hybrid Classifier with Variant Feature Sets (MHCVF)
Previous studies applied BP and C4.5 in IDSs and showed high detection rates [11] - [16] . Based on this knowledge, a hybrid approach that combines BP and C4.5 is applied. Before applying the hybrid method, a wrapper based FS is performed with DFBFS and BP to obtain the optimal feature subsets. According to the authors' knowledge this is the first study that applies DFBFS on the KDD cup'99 and ISCX datasets. The results are compared both with base classifiers and with other hybrid models and show promising results.
Datasets

The KDD Cup'99 Dataset
The KDD Cup'99 is one of the datasets used for the experiments. Even though there are some limitations mentioned in [13] , this dataset is still the most used dataset in IDS related papers [22] - [24] and is considered to be a classic challenge for IDS [25] . Because of the wide usage of the KDD Cup'99, it brings the opportunity to compare the results with many other studies. The KDD Cup'99 data is a version of the DARPA IDEVAL dataset and is used for The Third International Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Tools Competition. In 1998, the MIT Lincoln Labs conducted the Intrusion Detection Evaluation Program under DARPA's sponsorship. Through this program, a test bed was created to generate seven weeks of training data and two weeks of test data. The generated data, called the DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation (DARPA IDEVAL) dataset, is similar to the traffic that flows between a small Air Force LAN and the Internet. Both training and test data contain attacks that are grouped into four categories: probe (or surveillance), denial-of-service (DoS), remote-to-local (R2L), and user-toroot (U2R) attacks.
The aim of DoS attacks is to break and corrupt host or network services. Conversely, R2L attacks intend to obtain local access on a remote victim's machine, while the mission of U2R attacks is to gain root access to a machine of which the attacker is already a local user. Finally, the Probe attack scans the network to collect information, devices with improper configurations, and/or software bugs [26] . The IDEVAL dataset is processed into connection records to form the KDD Cup, which is the most popular dataset used for the evaluation of intrusion detection systems [27] . Each connection record has 41 attributes (see Table 2 ) and one label (attack name). The link in [28] provides the KDD Cup, KDD Cup 10%, and KDD Cup test (known as corrected) datasets.
In the experiments the KDD Cup 10% is used for training, while the KDD test data is used for the testing stage. To make the results possible to compare with other related studies, no random selection process on the test and train set is performed.
The KDD Cup 10% and KDD Cup test sets have Table 2 Attributes and their index number of the KDD Cup dataset Table 4 . In the experiments, the dataset is used in two different forms; in the first form, the output records are the class names. In the second form, the output records are the attack names. Both forms of datasets are actually the same, but their output types are converted from attack names to class names or vice versa.
A Real IDS Dataset
Publicly available datasets were explored to verify the effectiveness of our proposed method on a real dataset as well as KDD Cup'99. Because real world network communications usually contain less than 1% attack [29] , we concentrated on datasets whose attack rate is close to 1%. DefCon [31] contains only attacks that are created for competitions that are conducted yearly. Because DefCon only contains attacks, it is not similar to real world network traffic.
Another publicly available dataset is the TUIDS [32] , which is prepared at the Network Security Lab at Tezpur University, India. The dataset is based on different attack scenarios. However, it is different from real world network traffic because over 40% of the dataset contains attacks, whereas the ratio of real world attacks is estimated to be approximately 1% [29] .
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) [33] released 11 GB of anonymized packet traces of LBNL's enterprise traffic. The LBNL which are used to research On the other hand, CAIDA collects various types of data and serves it to the research community. Most of the CAIDA security datasets contain only a particular attack. For instance, "DDoS Attack 2007," "Backscatter," and "Telescope Sipscan" datasets contain only DDoS, DoS, and UDP Probing, respectively.
The Kyoto dataset [34] contains traffic data obtained from the Kyoto University's Honeypots from November 2006 to August 2009. Most of the traffic data captured from the honeypots are observed as attack data, while only a small amount of traffic was undefined. Therefore, all of the honeypot data are considered as attack data. On the other hand, normal traffic is generated through mail servers that were deployed into the same network with honeypots. Even though the mail server received small amount of attacks, they were considered as normal traffic [29] . The Kyoto dataset is considered a worthwhile dataset for the research community. However, the dataset contains a large amount of attacks and is not labeled manually by human experts.
The ISCX dataset [35] , which has been prepared at the Information Security Centre of Excellence at the University of New Brunswick, Canada, is based on different user profiles. Over two million real traffic packets consisting of HTTP, SMTP, SSH, IMAP, POP3, and FTP protocols were generated in seven days. Four different attack types, known as Brute Force SSH, Infiltrating, HTTP DoS, and DDoS are conducted on different days as shown in Table 5 . The percentage of attacks is 2.8%, which makes it similar to real world datasets. Even though minor disadvantages mentioned in [36] exist, we still used ISCX dataset to evaluate our method because it is the most applicable one compared to the other explored datasets.
Evaluation Criteria
As performance metrics, The Detection Rates (DRs), Accuracy, and False Alarm Rate (FAR), which are commonly used in IDS related papers [2] , [7] , [8] , [37] , are calculated. (14), (15) , and (16) describe the DR, FAR, and Accuracy, respectively.
False Alarm Rate
The cost matrix (Table 7) is used to calculate the Cost Per Example (CPE), which was primarily used in the KDD Cup contest for evaluation. The equation for CPE is given in Eq. (17) . In this equation, N represents the total number of instances, while M ij is the number of samples in class i that are classified as class j. C ij is the corresponding cost value from the cost matrix (Table 7) . The lower the CPE is, the better the IDS is.
Preprocessing
The original ISCX dataset has binary labels (Normal and Attack). The attack labels are changed to the name of attack. For instance, the attack names performed during 12/6/2010 are replaced with BruteForce. The dataset consists of 16 features (number of bytes, packets, payloads, TCP flag descriptions, IP addresses, and port numbers for both source and destination, time stamp, application name, protocol, and direction) and Tag (label). The IP addresses and Port numbers can be different for the same attack in different networks. Thus, IP addresses and Port numbers cannot generalize the characteristic of attacks. Therefore, we removed the IP addresses, port numbers, and payloads for our experiments. As a result, the following 10 features remained in the ISCX dataset: application name (a1), total source bytes (a2), total destination bytes (a3), total destination packets (a4), total source packets (a5), direction (a6), source TCP flag description (a7), destination TCP flag description (a8), protocol name (a9), and duration (a10). We removed repeated datasets and obtained a dataset (Table 8) with a 1.21% attack rate, which is similar to the ratio of real network communication [29] . Training and testing datasets are formed by the ISCX dataset in the ratios of 60% and 40%, respectively. Each Attack and Normal data has preserved the same ratio in the train and test sets.
Both training datasets (KDD Cup 10% and ISCX) are preprocessed for the DFBFS and for the BP algorithm independently. Before applying DFBFS, continuous values Table 8 Attack distribution of ISCX dataset after repeated data is removed Table 9 The discretized values of A1 of KDD dataset are converted into discrete numbers using the Entropy based discretization method [38] . This method recursively splits the attribute at a cut that gives the maximal information gain. All continuous features are discretized. For instance, feature A1, which ranged between 0-58329, is shown in Table 9 . On the other hand, for the BP algorithm, strings are converted into discrete numerical values, and numeric values then are normalized to the range of [0, 1] to avoid attributes with higher values dominating attributes with smaller values.
Feature Selection
A wrapper based FS is applied with two stages. In the first stage, the DFBFS is applied as a search algorithm to create candidate feature subsets and is applied on the discretized KDD Cup 10%, data as explained in Sect. 2. A Total of 930 candidate feature subsets each with 12-16 features are obtained. In the second stage, the Back-Propagation algorithm is applied on all 930 candidate feature subsets to evaluate them and find the subsets that provide the highest DRs for each class.
The KDD Cup 10% has 23 types of outputs; therefore, the BP algorithm is designed with 23 outputs and 23 hidden layers. The number of inputs is changed according to the number of features of each subset. The DR for each of 5 classes, the overall Accuracy, and FAR values are calculated with each candidate feature subset that is evaluated with the BP algorithm. Then the feature subsets with the best two DRs for each class and the overall Accuracy are adopted for future experiments. In other words, 12 feature subsets are obtained, each with a different number of features ranging from 13 to 16. DFBFS is applied on the ISCX dataset as well. Because the ISCX data has only 10 features and 4 attack types, we obtained only 3 minimal feature subsets. Therefore, there is no need to apply a wrapper based selection to decrease the feature subsets.
IDS with Back-Propagation Algorithm
In this study, the Back-Propagation algorithm is written in C programming language. The structure of the Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) for the ISCX dataset is chosen as N inputs, where N is equal to the number of attributes, N+1 hidden layers, and five outputs (Normal, BruteForce, Infiltrating, HTTPDoS and DDoS). Because the KDD Cup dataset is used in two different forms and has many feature subsets, applying the BP algorithm took more steps, as explained in this section. The structure of ANN for the KDD Cup dataset is changed according to the training data and its output type. If class names (Normal, DoS, Probing, U2R, and R2L) are used as the output type, the number of nodes in the output layer is set to 5; otherwise, the number of nodes is set to 23, which is the number of attacks presented in the training data. The input layer depends on the feature subsets. Some subsets have 13 features-in this case, the number of input Table 11 The results of the BP Algorithm applied on the KDD Test set. nodes is 13. The number of nodes in the hidden layer is chosen as X or X+1, where X is equal to MAX (number of nodes in Input Layer, number of nodes in Output Layer).
At the beginning of the algorithm, the structure of the ANN is set according to the output type, as shown in Table 10. All 12 subsets are evaluated with the BP algorithm. Afterward, the weights, obtained from the training, are used in the testing phase where the KDD Cup Test set is used. The algorithm is shown below, and results of this algorithm are given in Table 11 . Table 10 The ANN structure for both output types Table 12 The results of the C4.5 Algorithm applied on the KDD Test set Table 13 The results of the BP and C4.5 Algorithms applied on the ISCX Test set 3.6 IDS with C4.5 Algorithm
For the experiments, the J48, which is the implementation of the C4.5 (decision tree) learner that was written for WEKA software, is used. It is taken as a separate algorithm to evaluate the selected 12 feature subsets of the KDD Cup dataset. The steps followed for this algorithm are shown in Algorithm 3.
The decision tree that is obtained with WEKA J48 algorithm is used on another program written in C programming language to apply the tree on the test set. Excellent results are obtained with the C4.5 algorithm as shown in Table 12 . Notably, 81% of U2R attacks, 84% of R2L attacks, and over 99% of Probing attacks were detected, which are much higher than results obtained for other related studies. Normal data is detected with an average of 94% rate, while the False Alarm Rate is experienced at approximately 5%. Table 11 and Table 12 show that using the dataset in different forms (different output types) reveals various detection rates. Some classes are detected better with the dataset that uses the attack names as output, while some classes are better detected with the dataset that uses class names as output.
The same algorithm is applied on the ISCX dataset with WEKA to evaluate the feature subsets. Results of both BP and J48 for each feature subset are shown in Table 13 . It can been seen that J48 is able to detect all attack types, while BP only detects BruteForce attacks and Normal packets. For J48, the highest DRs of Normal and DDoS are obtained through tester id#1 with 99.9% and 66.3% rates, respectively. The highest DRs of BruteForce, Infiltrating, and HTTPDoS are obtained through tester id#3 with 98.1%, 19.7%, and 79%, respectively. The DR of Infiltrating attack is very low because during infiltrating, the attacker only gathers network information. Therefore, this attack type shows similar characteristics with Normal behaviors. For this reason, Infiltrating attacks are usually detected as Normal packets. BP is able to detect only Normal packets and BruteForce attacks, which are best detected through tester id#5 as 99.5% and 93.2%. Even though tester id#8 has 100% DR for Normal packets, this tester is discarded because it is not classifying any attack. 
Hybrid Model and Experimental Results
According to our experiments that are conducted on the KDD Cup dataset, Normal connections are best detected with the BP algorithm. Conversely, the highest DRs of DoS, Probing, U2R, and R2L attacks are obtained with the C4.5 algorithm. Table 14 illustrates that each of them is better with different feature subsets and dataset forms. The building time of each tester is also given in Table 14 . Because each class is detected with different methods, we propose a hybrid model to detect intrusions. In this model for KDD Cup, the test data is evaluated as shown in Fig. 2 . This model first applies the R2L tester, and it labels the record as R2L if it is predicted as R2L by the tester. If the record is not predicted as R2L, then it is passed to the next tester, and so on. The rest of the records are predicted for all classes at the Table 14 The algorithm, output type and feature Subset ID that give the best result for each class Fig. 2 The model of MHCVF for KDD Fig. 3 The model of MHCVF for ISCX last tester, which is the Normal tester.
The best DR for each algorithm is chosen in the hybrid model for the ISCX dataset. For instance, a Normal tester is chosen, one from the J48 algorithm (id#1) and one from the BP algorithm (id#5). In the same way, the BruteForce tester classifier id#3 and id#5 are chosen. The remaining attacks were only be detected with the J48 algorithm; therefore, one tester for each attack is selected. In the hybrid model, the ISCX dataset is evaluated as shown in Fig. 3 . Some of Attacks and Normal packets were detected by multiple testers. If the first one does not catch the attack, it may be detected by the next corresponding tester, which improves the DR.
The order of the testers in the hybrid method of KDD and ISCX is obtained empirically, and the testers are chosen according to their CPE values, and DR rates, respectively. The confusion matrix of the hybrid method is presented in Table 15 and Table 16 . The comparisons of the hybrid models with individual classifiers are shown in Table 17 and Table 18 for KDD and ISCX, respectively. Both results show that hybrid methods outperform base classifiers for most of the DRs of attacks. The performance metrics of our proposed IDS are compared with other methods that are presented on other research papers (Table 19 and Table 20) . We would like to note that there are some papers that used the KDD Test set with their proposed method [2] , [39] - [41] , but they included the http-tunnel attack into the U2R class [39] , [40] . In fact, the http-tunnel attack is a Remoteto-Local (R2L) attack [26] , which intends to gain local access from a remote machine. It creates a covert channel between the victim machine and the remote attacker that looks like normal web browsing connections. By using the covert channel, the attacker is able to install files from the victim machine and run UNIX commands remotely [26] . The total number of U2R attacks is 228 in [2] , [7] , [8] , [12] , [39] - [43] , where the http-tunnel attack is considered as a U2R attack. In this study, the http-tunnel attack is taken as a R2L attack, and the number of U2R attacks is 70.
According to [14] " were also able to detect these new attacks and showed 99.53% and 98.66% detection rates. Most particularly, the DR for U2R has a noticeable difference with other methods. We also obtained extremely good DR for R2L that is very close to the rate presented in [2] . However, it should be noted that in [2] , the test data has been selected randomly, while in this study the whole test dataset has been used. With respect to CPE, this approach can achieve as low as 0.056, which is remarkably better than 0.233, 0.181, and 0.222, which are the CPE's reported in [2] , [40] and [25] , respectively. However, it does not demonstrate an acceptable False Alarm Rate (FAR). The FAR is calculated as 5.71%, which is considered high, as the goal for it to be lower than 5%. We compared our results for the ISCX dataset with Table 21 Comparisons of training and testing time other related studies in Table 20 . Our method gives promising results in Accuracy and DR of Normal packets. Moreover, the FAR is lower than the FAR of other studies. The DR of attacks is 68%, which is very low according to [44] - [46] , in which the DRs are greater than 90%. However, it should be noted that the comparisons in Table 20 cannot be trusted because they are not conducted on the same part of the ISCX dataset. The ISCX dataset is not divided as train and test set by the provider; therefore, for each study, part of the ISCX dataset was selected and divided as train and test set in its own way. Because many of researchers only use a part of the train and test set, it is difficult to compare training and testing time with them. The studies that are listed in Table 19 , except [2] , used the entire datasets, but only two of them report the execution times, which are shown in Table 21 . All experiments were conducted on a PC with 2.39 GHz CPU, 16 GB of RAM, and Windows 7 operating system. The training took a longer time than in [2] . However, in [2] the experiments are not done on the whole dataset; therefore, we cannot say that it is faster. Of note, our method is trained faster than [14] . On the other hand, [14] is superior than MHCVF in terms of testing time, which for the former is as low as 4 minutes. To effectively detect in real time, the testing time of our method should be improved.
Conclusions
This study has improved the detection rate of attack classes and made IDSs more efficient. We applied DFBFS on the KDD Cup 10% and ISCX dataset and obtained 930 candidate feature subsets and four feature subsets, respectively, that represent the whole dataset. Then the candidate subsets for the KDD Cup dataset are evaluated using the BP algorithm to find 12 optimum feature subsets that were adopted for the remaining experiments. Following this, the training dataset is converted into two forms with different output labels: Attack names and Class names. The BP and C4.5 learners are applied on both forms of the training set with each adopted feature subset. Afterward, the learners are applied on the KDD and ISCX Test sets for performance comparisons.
One of the contributions of this study is that it shows that changing the output type (converting the attack names to class names or vice versa) affects the detection rates of the tester. Additionally, according to the knowledge of the authors, this study is the first one that uses the DFBFS on an intrusion detection dataset. The results show that different feature subsets provide different detection rates for each class. Therefore, each class is classified with its own optimum feature subset. Moreover, the results show that using the hybrid method of BP and C4.5 gives better detection rates than using the classifiers individually. Consequently, a hybrid MHCVF that uses different learners and feature subsets for each class is proposed. The ISCX dataset shows better rates on Accuracy and FAR than other studies, whereas the DR for attacks is low and should be improved. Conversely, the results for the KDD dataset demonstrate approximately 12%, 2%, and 1% better accuracy rates on U2R, Probe and DoS attack classes, respectively, and a better Cost Per Example (CPE) value, which was the primary evaluation method in the KDD'99 Cup competition. So it can be stated that the MHCVF is superior to the existing IDS methods in terms of four attack classes and CPE value. Unfortunately, the FAR value is computed as 5.71%, which is considered to be too high. Therefore, this system should be improved to decrease the FAR while preventing any decrease in the DRs of the four attack classes. This problem is left as our future work.
